

THE COMMITTEE OF ANTI DAL-KAJBAR DAMS
Nubia- Sudan
A Letter to the Sinohydro Company, China
&
The Chinese Government via the Chinese Embassy, Khartoum
THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT PLAN OF DEMOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING OF
NUBIA
&
THE CHINESE & EGYPTIAN CONNECTION TO IT
A LETTER OF PROTEST & RESISTANCE

TO
The Chinese Government
BEIJING, CHINA
12 January 2011

SINOHYDRO CO.
BEIJING, CHINA
12 January 2011

Executive Summary

We, in the Anti Dal-kajbar dam Committee, address this letter of protest and resistance to the both the Chinese Government and the Chinese company called Sinohydro so as to bring to their attention the total rejection of the Nubians to be affected with the Kajbar dam whose construction contract the named company has lately won. We believe that the building of this dam (and its other sister, Dal dam) is part of an official plan of demographic engineering so as to enhance the Arabization of the Nubians by resettling them far from their homeland. The evacuated area will then be populated by Egyptian peasants. We consider this plan as a crime against humanity upon which we call the international community to show its responsibility and commitment to the human rights of the Nubians. We also bring to the attention of the named company and other parties involved that both Kajbar dam and Dal dam will bring misery to the area similar to that of Darfur, and that it will be of no substantial benefit either with regard to power or irrigation.

We believe that the concerned parties will give heed to the alarms raised by the Nubians. The implementation of these dams in the Sudan has failed to meet the criteria set up by the World Dams Commission. No consultation has been made with the affected people; no heed is given to their just demands; and the reaction of the government of Khartoum has been ruthless to any manifestation of public protest and rejection.

1. INTRODUCTION

In 2005, immediately after signing the Naivacha Agreement between the Government of the Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM), the National Congress Party (NCP) held its general congress where the former minister of Finance, Abdul Rahim Hamdi, presented a paper in which he drew a triangle that comprises roughly the middle of the Sudan under the claim that this is what will remain after the disintegration of the Sudan with southern region, Darfur and other areas breaking away; hence the Hamd's Triangle¹. This report marks the official endorsement to the policy of Demographic Re-engineering, upon which areas lying outside this triangle were to be quickly Arabized by, 1, resettling the African ethnic groups deep inside the triangle, a matter will eventually lead them to be completely Arabized, and 2, by a new Arab population injection from outside the Sudan. In fact the government of the Sudan started implementing this scheme in Darfur years before the signing of Naivacha Agreement (in 1994), where Arab tribes from over Chad and Niger were welcomed into the country. Without addressing the issue of land grabbing that has taken place in Darfur, upon which the African ethnic groups have lost their lands, no peace is deemed possible. The Hamdi Triangle dates the time where the policy of Demographic Engineering has been implemented in other parts of the Sudan, such as Nuba Mountains (southern Kurdufan), eastern Sudan (the Gash and Tokar delta) and northern Sudanese Nubia². In the case of Sudanese Nubians, the Arab population injection will be brought this time from Egypt (Arab Egyptian peasants). The legalization for this Egyptian mass settlement in northern Sudan has already been provided by the signing of the Four Freedoms Agreement (2005) upon which citizens from both countries are free to move from one country to the other without obstruction; they are free to do business; to own lands; and to settle. In 2004 there were only 20.000 Egyptian people in the Sudan; now they are over 3 millions. They all entered Sudan without visa; however, Sudanese citizens below 50 years old (i.e. the productive age) still need visa to enter Egypt.

¹ Cf. Abdul Rahīm Hamdi (Former Minister of Finance). 2005. *Al-waraqā al-iqtisādiyya li'l-mu'tamar al-watani al-hākim bi'l-Sudan* [The Economic Paper for the National Congress, the ruling Party in the Sudan]. In this document, he draws a triangle that he calls "the axis of Dungula, Sinnāar, and Kurdufān" (mihwar Dungula, Sennār, Kurdufān), P. 2, which comprises the traditional middle-north. In this document the ruling party clearly addresses the problem of restricting the public funding in this area as a precaution step toward the separation of southern Sudan, Darfur and other areas in order to forbid non-Arab groups from having the upper hand in running the country as "the countries of the belt partitioning Islam from Sub-Sahara have done (such as Ethiopia, Senegal, passing to Niger)". It reads: "What is required at the present relates to how to keep the identity of the nation [Islam and Arabism] rather than to how to keep the structure of the state".

² Cf. Hashim, M.J. 2006. Islamization and Arabization of Africans as a Means to Political Power in the Sudan: Contradictions of Discrimination based on the Blackness of Skin and Stigma of Slavery and their Contribution to the Civil Wars. In: Bankie, B.F. & Mchombu, K. (ed). 2006. *Pan-Africanism: Strengthening the Unity of Africa and its Diaspora*. Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmillan.

The Khartoum government is aware that these demographic upheavals will neither pass unnoticed by the concerned people nor will the international community let them get away with it. However, it is sure that it will take considerably long time for all these parties to take due measures. By then they aim to create new situations on the ground that no one can reverse, just as the case in Darfur³.

The Mirwi dam has clearly shown that the flooded areas will be evacuated in the same way that took place in the case of Aswan High Dam. Incidentally news broke out revealing plans that aim at bringing in millions of Egyptian peasants to settle in the areas evacuated by the indigenous groups. Such a plan of demographic engineering will naturally be implemented in collaboration with the Egyptian government; it was the Egyptian government who first engendered this plan in its own Nubian region. It seems that this is not the first time for the Khartoum government to adopt such a policy as it was implemented in Darfur leading to the crisis there. In the case of Darfur a whole Arab nomadic tribe from Chad and Niger was welcomed into the region. It was armed and supported by the Sudanese government to eventually wreak havoc in Darfur.⁴

2. THE DAMMING OF NORTHERN SUDAN

More dams are also being built in other areas of northern Sudan. This damming of northern Sudan has a history; it started in 1903 up to 1964 when the High Aswan dam was built at the 1st cataract. In all this, the affected population has not benefited in any way conceivable. The presidential-mandated Dams Implementation Unit (DIU) declared plans to construct more than 20 dams with six of them in northern Sudan; Mugrat, Dagash and al-Shireik Dams at the 5th cataract (affecting Ja'aliyyin and Rubatab tribes); Mirwi dam (or Merowe dam) at the 4th cataract (has already affected all Manasir tribe and part of Shayqiyya tribe); Kajbar dam at the 3rd cataract (affecting the southern part of Mahas Nubians and the northern part of Dungula Nubians); and Dal dam at the 2nd cataract (affecting all Sukkout Nubians and the northern Mahas Nubians).

THE TWO DAMS IN NUBIA

³ Cf. Hashim, M.J. 2008. The Dam Building in Northern Sudan: is it a Tool for the Resettlement of Millions of Egyptian Peasants? Is it a New Darfur Scenario in the Making? BPP School of Law, London. 24.9.2008. In Arabic Online:

⁴ <http://www.abritabag.net/vb/showthread.php?t=8330>.

Ibid.

1. Kajbar Dam (3rd Cataract)

The main reference relied on in this regard is a study prepared by the DIU⁵. So far, this is the only release of the DIU with regard to Kajbar dam; the summary is not a study in the strict meaning of the word, but rather a mobilization introduction aimed at the de-sensitization of the affected people toward the project. Kajbar is a small village in the middle of the Nubian Mahas region about 120 km down the river from Dungula, the capital of the northern state. The most northerly part of the third cataract ends at Kajbar, where the government declared in 1995 its plans to build a dam. The causes for proposing the building of Kajbar dam is to generate power (Installed Capacity of 360 MW). The objective listed in the Informative Summary are vaguely general without specifying a single project with a specific name of product, area, producer, investor let alone ways of marketization and/or industrialization.

The Funding of the Project

When the idea of the dam was hatched in 1995, a company was established under the name of Kajbar Electricity Co. The company financed the initial studies and designs which were made by the Russian Institute of Hydro-Project. The share holders were as follows:

- The Government of the Northern State
- The Farmers Union of Northern State
- The Cooperative Union of the Northern State
- The Women Union in the Northern State
- The Bank of Khartoum
- The Islamic bank of the North
- The farmers Bank
- Individual shareholders from the Northern State

The accompanying projects

No accompanying projects were mentioned in the Informative Summary. The Informative Summary says about this: “By transferring the project to the Dam Implementation Unit (DIU) all the documents and studies have become the property of DIU”. Neither a date is given when this took place nor any information about what has become of the shares of those holders. No information is either given about who is funding the project or who is implementing it. However, other sources say that it is a partially financed by China. Matthias Muindi writes⁶: “Of the three

⁵ Wuhdat tanfīz al-sudūd, ri’āsat al-jamhūriyya [Dam Implementation Unit (The Presidency)]. March 2008. *mashrū’ sadd Kajbar: ma’lūmāt muwjaza: mashrū’ i’ādat binā’ al-ḥadāra bi-i’ādat al-tawṭīn* [The Project of Kajbar Dam: an Informative Summary: the Project of re-building Civilization through Re-Settlement], to be referred to as “Informative Summary”.

⁶ “Dam could provoke water wars”, *News from Africa*, January 2002.

dams that Awadh al-Jaz, Minister of Energy and Mining, approved in April 1998, the Merowe Dam will be the second to be constructed. The other, Kajbar Dam on the second cataract, has been under construction since late 1998. It is co-financed by the Sudan and China governments and is expected to add another 300 megawatts. China, which is financing 75 percent of the project, has so far spent US\$200 million on the project⁷.

Construction Companies

Sinohydro Company (China) which has already won the contract on 28 October 2010.
The China International Water & Electric Corporation CWE and CCMD Consortium (China)?
Harbin Power Engineering Company (China)?

Power, Construction & Reservoir

FSL: El. 218 / 213 m
Dam Height : 17 m
Installed Capacity : 300 / 108 MW
Reservoir: 3 km³
Length: 67.5 km long (20% of the Nile annual flow)

Collateral Damage

No figure is given with regard to the archaeological sites to be submerged

No figure is given about the number of people to be displaced in the Informative Summary; however, other sources give the figure of 10-20 thousands

Cultivated land lost is 3.600 according to the Informative Summary, a matter the affected people do not agree with

One main ethnic group to be affected (the Mahas) plus part of the northerly Danagla

No proper resettlement has been arranged; the Informative Summary, which is issued in March 2008, states that the preliminary studies have indicated toward the suitability of Kukka Plains, immediately upstream from the dam site on the left bank of the Nile, with only 15.000 fedans. It admits that the area has neither been studied in a proper way nor there any exact statistics

⁷

Cf. http://www.newsfromafrica.org/newsfromafrica/articles/art_609.html.

At least 500 archaeological sites will be submerged (the area surveyed from the site of the dam upstream to Tombos, approximately 20 km (i.e. out of the 70 km which is the extent of the dam lake)⁸.

Clashes between the affected people and the military militia related to the Dam Implementation Unit (DIU) in June 2006.

Criticism

Weakness of 1995 Mahmoud Sharif's Feasibility Studies

Outdated assessment studies

Inadequacy of resettlement issues or the environmental and cultural impact studies

Lack of transparency

Disregard of the international principles

2. Dal Dam (2nd cataract)

The information on Dal dam is very scanty due to the lack of transparency that has so far characterized the policies of the Dam Implementation Unit (DIU). Three sources only have been available. The first is the study conducted by the Russian Hydroproject Institute⁹. The second study is the pre-feasibility study was conducted in November 2006 by EDF Scot Wilson¹⁰. The third source is a study prepared by the DIU¹¹, which will be given special emphasis as it is the only document that issued by the DIU. The fact that the information related to Dal dam is included in a DIU publication that bears the title *Kajbar Dam Project* is very telling of either the unprofessional way of doing its job or of its intention to envelop its job with shrouds of ambiguity and obliteration.

The Informative Summary (March 2008) states that the field studies have already begun and were supposed to finish in August the same year. So far, nothing has come out to this effect. It also states that the studies targeted two scenarios, names Low Dal (201 m above sea level) and

⁸ Cf. Edward, D & Osman, A. 1992. *The Mahas Survey, 1991: Interim Report & Site Inventory*. Khartoum: University of Khartoum; Edward, D & Osman, A. 1994. *The Mahas Survey, 1990: Interim Report & Site Inventory*: Khartoum: University of Khartoum; Osman, A. & Edward, D. 2002. *The Mahas Survey, 2000: a Preliminary Report*. Khartoum: University of Khartoum.

⁹ Principal Features of Projects in Sudan (Nile Waters Study 1978, Acres 1993, PB Power 2006).

¹⁰ Cf. *Consultancy Services for Eastern Nile Technical Power Trade Investment Program Study*, Khartoum, 2006.

¹¹ Wuhdat tanfīz al-sudūd, ri'āsat al-jamhūriyya [Dam Implementation Unit (The Presidency)]. March 2008. *mashrū' sadd Kajbar: ma'lūmāt muwjaza: mashrū' i'ādat binā' al-ḥadāra bi-i'ādat al-tawṭīn* [The Project of Kajbar Dam: an Informative Summary: the Project of re-building Civilization through Re-Settlement], referred to above as "Informative Summary".

High Dal (219 m above sea level). The Informative Summary does not give the exact heights of any of them (however, other sources show this, see below). Then it states that the socio-ecological studies have proved the infeasibility of Dal High. The Informative Summary does not mention any details about any socio-ecological studies. However, a social impact assessment is claimed to have been conducted¹². The people of Sai island, which lies about 50 km upstream from the site of Dal dam, told the present investigator¹³ that they chased out a team that had tried to conduct such a social impact survey starting with Sai island in June 2008. However, the same team did conducted the survey covering the area from Saadin Fenti (north Mahas region) down to Akasha which is about 20 km downstream from Dal village¹⁴.

Low Dal

(Source: EDF Scot Wilson, *ibid*)

Low to moderate dam height, 20 – 45 metres
Extensive bedrock evident at site in river channel and on abutments
Geological mapping proposed
Cost (Millions Euro) : 298.600

Assessment of Dal Site (Low option)

Dam Hieight : 25 + 20 m
Installed Capacity MG: 340 + 108/300
Annually Energy Generation GWh/yr : 3.000-4.000
Population displaced by Reservoir : 5.000-10.000

High Dal

(Source: EDF Scot Wilson¹⁵)

Dam Height: 45 m
Installed Capacity MG: 700-800
Annually Energy Generation GWH/yr: 4.000-5.000
Population displaced by Reservoir: 10.000-20.000

¹² Cf. the Republic of Sudan, the Presidence of the Republic, Dams Implementation Unit. 2007. *Prefeasibility & Feasibility Studies of Dal Hydroproject. Task 2 & 3. Social Impact Assessment Study: Fieldworks Guidebook and Questionnaires*. Prepared by: EDF Generation & Engineering Division. December 20, 2007.

¹³ An interview on 9th December 2008.

¹⁴ Personal communication, 12.3.2009.

¹⁵ *Ibid*.

Assessment of Dal Site (High option)

Very low topography, especially on West bank
Shallow reservoir, high evaporation losses
Only power benefits, no benefits from irrigation, flood alleviation or regulation
High affected population 10,000 – 20,000
Substantial loss of date palm trees and irrigated agriculture
Rumours among the local people talk about a third scenario of Dal Higher, whose lake will extend to 20 km upstream from the site of Kajbar dam. It is claimed that this is Plan B in case of cancelling Kajbar dam due to pressure from the local communities of the affected Mahas and northerly Danagla lest they get united against the government.

Power, Construction & Reservoir

(Source: EDF Scot Wilson¹⁶)
FSL : El. 218 / 201 m
Dam Height : 45 / 20 m
Installed Capacity : 780 / 340 MW

Collateral Damage

No figure is given with regard to the archaeological sites to be submerged;
No figure is given about the number of people to be displaced in the Informative Summary; however, other sources give the figure of 10-20 thousands;
Cultivated land lost is 3.600 according to the Informative Summary, a matter the affected people do not agree with;
One main ethnic group to be wholly affected (the Sikkout) plus part of the northerly Mahas;
No proper resettlement has been arranged; the Informative Summary, which is issued in March 2008, does not say anything about the resettlement of the affected people;
No archaeological survey has been conducted to assess the possible loss of sites and antiquities. However, five major sites of antiquities, namely Amara West, Sai, Seidenga, Soleb, and Sesebi are potentially and directly threatened by the construction of the dam¹⁷.
Clashes between the affected people and the authorities of the State in 2008 indicate in the future the same will happen with the Dam Implementation Unit (DIU) when it starts the construction.

Criticism

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ For the importance of these sites, cf. Welsby, Derek A. & Anderson, Julie R. (ed.). 2004. *Sudan: Ancient Treasures*. London: the British Museum.

Weakness of the studies of Informative Summary¹⁸, Hydroproject Institute¹⁹ and the pre-feasibility study by EDF Scot Wilson²⁰.

Scientific and Methodological deficiencies;

Inadequacy of resettlement issues or the environmental and cultural impact studies prepared by EDF Generation & Engineering Division²¹;

Lack of transparency

Disregard of the international principles

3. CONSEQUENCES AND REACTION OF AFFECTED PEOPLE

The “shoot-to-kill” policy of DIU

The government of the Sudan has been so far ruthless in facing any counter movement by the dams affected people. It opened live fire on any peaceful demonstration mounted by the affected people, killing and injuring its own citizen. On the 22nd of April, 2006 in Amri island government security forces, militia groups and special paratroops belonging to the DIU opened fire on a small congregation of people who resisted being evicted. Three people were killed immediately with others injured. The murderous attack was strongly condemned: “As relayed by several witnesses, as well as families of the injured citizens, the attack was planned and executed by the assaulting troop in collaboration with the security headquarters of the dam administration, which had been threatening with ‘severe reactions’ the natives opposing the dam’s location and the resettlement plans far away from their ancestral land at the Nile bank”²².

Shooting in Kajbar

In 2005 the governor of North State, ministers, and top officials of DIU assured the people that the dam was not going to be built without their explicit consent. These pledges were said to be based on a direct order from the President that not to build any dam against the will of the people of the concerned area. Accordingly, the Nubians wanted to show their total rejection to the dam-building. On the 10th of April 2007 they organized a peaceful demonstration in the villages overlooking the cataract, which was assumed to be the site of the dam. Live fire was opened on the unarmed people wounding at least five people.

On the 13th of June 2007 the villagers organized another peaceful demonstration that started from a village called Farrēg and then headed down the river toward the cataract. About five km up the

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Op cit.*

²² For more details of the incident, see: http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php?id_article=15235.

river from the cataract, the demonstration was ambushed by a group of heavily armed force that was positioned atop the mountain. The force opened fire killing instantly four people with one of them (Muhammad Faqir) a teenager of only 18 years old. More than 15 people were injured. The massacre, filmed by a video amateur, shows the armed men cheering and dancing when shooting the villagers²³. More than 20 people were arrested, including journalists²⁴, leading figures of Nubian activists in Khartoum and northern Sudan²⁵ for months²⁶. On 24/6/2007 the Attorney General office dispatched a memo to all newspapers prohibiting them from publishing any material discussing the issue of Kajbar bloodshed or dam²⁷.

4. Concluding demands: Hereby, we, in the Anti Dal-Kajbar Dams Committee, demand from Sinohydro Company, first, to withdraw from this project, and, secondly to contact directly the affected people through us so as to see that the people totally reject the building of both the named dams or either of them.

Contact Persons:

Khartoum, Sudan:

1. M. Jalal Hashim

Tel: +249914490044

Email: mjalalhashim@gmail.com

Blogger: <http://www.mjhashim.blogspot.com/>

Facebook: <http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=105753522790765>

2. Abdalla Abo Zaid

Tel: +249912960239

Email: abozaidlaw@yahoo.com

²³ See: <http://www.youtube.com/user/nabielogr>.

²⁴ See: <http://www.copts.com/english1/index.php/2007/08/07/amnesty-calls-for-release-of-sudan-detainees/>.

²⁵ See: http://www.amnesty.org/en/alfresco_asset/55c51b81-a2ba-11dc-8d74-6f45f39984e5/afr540532007en.html.

²⁶ See: <http://platform.blogs.com/passionofthepresent/2007/07/new-arrest-foll.html>.

²⁷ Cf. *Al-Sudani Newspaper*, 24/6/2007, Issue No. 575.

London, the United Kingdom:

1. Hamza Uwais

Tel: +447810657298

Email: hamza@kajbar.net

2. Geili Farah

Tel: +447967719461

Email: geilifarah@hotmail.com