

**Globalization and the State in the Red Sea Hills:  
Beja issues on resources management and prospectus of Peace\***

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**Globalization and Marginalization: Historical Trends:**

The main argument in this paper is, the Red Sea region has been witnessing negligence and marginalization for decades by national and international powers. This could be divided into two: Historical marginalization and New marginalization

Globalization and marginalization are considered as a process and therefore its historical context, development and impacts on the Red Sea areas are taken into account.

To begin with it worth mentioning some conceptual aspects related to globalisation, a term which means different thing to different people. Various definitions have been given to globalisation, internationalisation, or mondialisation which have been portrayed as a condition of the present and the future; a phenomenon without a past. It is associated with new and unprecedented technologies; the Internet, international capital markets, supersonic travel, just-in-time deliveries across very large distances and cable news.

My understanding to globalisation it is a historical economic process emerged and developed with emergence and development of capitalist Europe, which



expanded to seize control of resources in other territories through free trade and exchange.

Historically, the notions of internalisation/ globalization is rooted in the writings and work of late eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophers like Adam Smith(1), the French mathematician and economist Condorcet (1776) and German economist Adam Müller (1809). In this respect, some scholars(2) argue that there are two prime and closely related ways of looking at globalisation in historical perspective, having to do with the history of international relationships, and the history of international ideas. The first is concerned with the economic and social history of the relations between nations, and in particular with the history of earlier periods of rapid increase in international trade, international investment, international communication, and international influence(3).

In African and developing world context, globalization has been viewed as an extension to colonialism, imperialism and domination of powerful nation over other nations. In this context Said (2000) linked 'universalism' to however happened to be powerful, while Mazroui (2005) and others pan Africanist has been looked upon as both economic and cultural process supported by religion, culture and technology. In this respect, globalization was viewed as a process of impoverishment and marginalisation of Africa. It has also linked to inequality through monopoly of capital, unequal economic-political powers and pricing labour. They also claimed that; in global terms Africa as a whole was economically on the periphery, that has been culturally globalized but economically marginalized(4).

The main argument in the context of Red Sea is that the expansion of international trade had created wealth by exploiting resources in this region of



Sudan, which continued to serve global economy with oil, gold, oil, cotton and cheap labour. The irony is that this region has not yet received any fruits of globalization. Its population continued to suffer loss of land, negligence, inequality and hunger. In this respect this paper intends to highlight both the historical and modern forces which created the such marginal position and eventually contributed to the rise of grassroots resistance of Beja people. Issues related to growing support of Beja Congress will be analysed in the context of growing demands to abolition of marginalisation, greater representation in power and greater share of Eastern Sudan wealth.

The paper acknowledges the significance of Red Sea Region and Eastern Sudan to regional stability and future of peace in North East Africa, Horn of Africa and Middle East and, consequently, suggests some ways out from the current situation will be suggested.

### **Red Sea Hills: Background Information**

Red Sea (Al Bahr al Ahmar) is one of the 26 *wilayat* or states and a major state on Eastern Sudan which are made up of the states of Red Sea, Kassala and Al-Gedaref. The total population of the three states is estimated to be approximately 3,746,000. The two states which are the focus of the study, Kassala and Red Sea, have respective populations of 1,507,000 and 724,000, occupying about 260,000 square kilometres. Red Sea State's capital city, Port Sudan is home to about 55.2% of the State population and over 90% of the overall urban population in the region.

Beja(5) pastoralists and agro-pastoralists had long ago inhabited the area, although a wide variety of ethnic groups from across the Sudan can be found in the two state capitals, Port Sudan and Kassala. The Beja are a confederation of



tribes united by a common language, *TuBedawye*, a Cushitic idiom, and a common segmentary structure, where each lineage is linked to a common ownership and use of land. The Beja have retained a distinctive culture and their own language despite having mixed for centuries with Arab immigrants into their region. The three main groups making up the Beja are the Hadendowa, the Bishariyyin, the Amar'ar/Atmaan, Beni Amer(6). Among the three main groups of the Hadendowa are perhaps the most numerous and powerful. There are also groups of Arabic/Semitic origin who gradually adopted the Beja language (*TuBedawye*,) and culture and have been largely subsumed into the Beja. Smaller groups in the area include the Helenga(7) of Kassala, the Rashaida who are a Bedouin group migrated from the northern Arabian Peninsula in the 19th century; many of them maintain close social and economic connection with Gulf countries.

During the colonial era of the early 20th century under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, new economic ventures were introduced which partially affected the life-style of the Beja. The region was subject to minor agricultural (developmental) activities manifested in building of Suakin and Port Sudan and establishing of Gash- Baraka cotton projects to serve the purpose of Turkish then Anglo-'Turkish' Egyptian colonial powers. These included the development of cotton cultivated schemes in the 'deltas' of the Baraka and Gash rivers, and opening of a new port at Port Sudan. Several of the Amar'ar clan took jobs as workers on the dock, whilst the Hadendowa and some of the Bishariyyin took up seasonal cultivation in the Tokar and al-Gash schemes.

Part of Beja groups have been gradually transforming from a traditional nomadic way of life, mostly as camel herders to petite traders, urban poor and cheap manual workers on the dock of Port Sudan. The Bishariyyin, and the



Amar'ar, raised only camels were among those who took jobs in the port, while some of Hadendowa and other Beja sub-groups who were involved in grain cultivation (‘dura’ sorghum), and caravan services were transformed into labour in cotton projects of Gash and Tokar Delta. Many *Fulani* tribes of West African were migrated to work as agricultural labour in cotton projects of Gash and Baraka areas. Traders from the north and other riverian Sudanese(8) also dwelled in delta areas and in Prot Sudan. Despite these socio-economic and demographic changing processes, pastoralism, however, continued on of main Beja livelihood, especially for the Hadendowa, who showed less fondness towards urban life.

### **Mechanisms of Control: land and State hegemony**

Policies contributed marginalization and reinforcing of the peripheral status of the region were practised via various mechanisms:

- 1- Land tenure system deprived local population from communal land and later contributed to limiting of their pastoralist livelihood
- 2- New capitalist projects contributed to their further deprivation, through a production process/ relations controlled by the state.
- 3- Lack of investment in socio- economic infrastructure.
- 4- Political exclusion form decision-making bodies in central government.

To discuss the matter with the regional and national context, Sudan has many problems of land ownership. It has customary systems of land tenure(9), for farmers and pastoralists, existing alongside ‘modern’ land law. Customary systems are varied, including the historic land charters of the Beja, Nubian, Funj and Fur tribal regions, the inheritance systems developed close to the Nile.



When Sudan was re-conquered by Britain one hundred years ago, there were two types of ownership:

1. Communal or tribal ownership, namely land owned by the community at large.
2. Individual ownership and to other titles to land Individual ownership was achieved either by the regular evolution method whereby communal ownership changed to individual or by grants made by the sovereign.

The most essential dilemma concerning rural land tenure is to be found in the principle, introduced by the British colonial power in 1898, that unregistered land is assumed to be owned by the government unless the contrary is proven. That principle was in fact valid in the Funj, Fur Sultanates, the Turkish and the Mahdia States, and all of them have also allocated land for political reasons. The administrative limitations of those states, whoever, did not allow them to control the land in the scale reached after the Condominium era.

While the British adopted a policy of limiting land acquisition by merchants and non-Sudanese individuals, they confiscated huge areas of irrigable land in Tokar Delta on the Red Sea, and Gash, in order to establish cotton cultivation. This was done at the behest of the Lancashire textile industry that needed a secure and cheap supply of cotton. The main legal codification of the colonial government's land law was the Land Settlement and Registration Ordinance of 1925.

Since Independence, successive Sudanese governments repeatedly took control of tribal unregistered land, while affluent and powerful individuals, usually with links to the state, have also made use of the colonial and post-colonial laws to acquire large areas of land. Various legislations, up to the 1990 amendment to



the Civil Transactions Act, has not changed this fundamental aspect of Sudanese land law, but on the divergent strengthened the privileges of the state and those with access to it, at the expense of rural people.

Furthermore, strengthening central government land privileges in remote regions were achieved through various mean. The most essentials, however, are; the erosion of tribal homelands of pastoralist groups and abolition of local leadership. Thus an essential component of pastoral land law represented in notion of 'dar' or tribal homeland has been taken away. Other local customary rules *Uruf*, which govern access to land and water resources by community members and outsiders (non-community members) by emphasising the communality of land ownership, is no longer valid to government. Thus the main restrained elements to the state and business expansions were changed by using state hegemony and power over local nomads. The ultimate result was lost of control of rural population over their homelands. Further more local and tribal leaders- native administration- were stripped out of their traditional authorities in licensing and giving access and consent to members of the tribe and outsiders access to pasture and water sources and lead to government being the sole decision maker of tribal land.

Land Act of 1970-1971 related to abolition of native administration went hand in hand with a process of privatization that took places between 1970 and 1986, when huge area of rural Sudan were changed to private ownership. Private mechanized farming expanded to million hectares to over two decades. It's important to acknowledge that privatization involved buying-using cash- and registration of land. These two factors were totally an alien to Beja people who are not familiar with the importance of registration and private ownership. As a



result vast part of rain-fed, costal and urban borders were registered as a private ownership leaving Beja in a situation of complete loss.

The victims of this policy were both the pastoralists themselves and smallholder farmers in local villages, who could not defend their farms against the herds. Many academics and researchers(10) viewed the expansion of mechanized farming in pastoralist areas of Eastern and Western Sudan as a dominant factor of limiting movement of pastoralist Hadendowa of the Red Sea down to their traditional summer grazing in south Kassala and Gadarif areas, a factor which added to their vulnerability and bushing them to the margins(11).

### **Oil and gold explorations and concessions:**

Since 1977 the Government of Sudan (GoS) has licensed and gave concession to various oil foreign firms. Licenses of oil and gas explorations were given to companies including; America Pacific (around Tokar area), Paul & Collins, Ocean Links and Sheveron Sudan. Russian and German firms were also given permission to operate in mineral sector in the region(12). In 1988 a Swiss-based Banaco firm was given permission to operate nearby Suakin area.

The recent regime of National Islamic Front (NIF) has shown greater interests in Red Sea mineral resources. Advertisement of richness of this area is found on various Sudan embassies websites(13). Facilitations were given to many firms to operate in North West Port Sudan and ‘Ariab Gold Belt’. resulted in giving access more privatization of mountainous land n order to have more access to valleys rich in oil and gold. Coastal areas were also surveyed for the purpose of duty free zones near by Port Sudan.





To attract more multinationals to invest in the region, **GoS** offered all means of help in buying land and giving concession without consideration to local needs. Thus, the commercialization of land in Red Sea extended lately intensified to embrace both registered and unregistered land. In many areas even pasture is becoming privately owned, with grass enclosures being set up. This is probably inevitable, as supply and demand creates a market in any commodity that is scarce. Any attempt to take land out of the realm of market forces altogether is therefore doomed to failure. This was evident in 2001 **GoS** allocation of some oil fields zones in the red Sea Hills to some Chinese firms. Meanwhile Field No. 9 and No.11 were granted to Russian firms(14). In additions, refineries and the pipelines constructed to serve oil industry are imposing more obstacles to movements of nomads and their environment.

### **Gold Mines: concessions and revenues:**

Information obtained from Sudan geological surveys and maps(15) shows that large part of Red Sea region concessions of areas with huge revenues gold, these are:

Gabaiet Gold Mines: 280 km North-West Port Sudan. Mining activities started 1980s and production started 1987. Currently two Chinese firms are involved in gold exploration, one in Gabaiet and on in nearby Sholai area.

1- Ariab Gold Mines: Concessions were granted to Ariab Gold Company, a joint French-Sudanese firm.

2- Aberkataib Mines: Concessions were given to Irish Company during 1960s. No information available resent concessions.

3- North West Port Sudan mines: field work started in 1991



By December 1991 companies of North West Port Sudan belt declared the commercial production of gold. The results of gold production and exports were shown and for the first time in Sudan foreign trade balance. Profits from the Red Sea gold appears in records of country's foreign exports revenues.

Sudan Minister of Finance told Emirate-based El-Etihad on 5/6/2001 that Sudan's gold exports estimated \$60000 in 1996. In 2001 Sudan declared that its share from Gold 512 million dollar and the French company profit from gold estimated to 93 million Frank.

With rising criticism from both locals and their representatives, the Beja Congress criticised both companies and Government of being only concerned with profits. Gold companies were also blamed for environmental pollution. Farouk Gadu a member of National Congress (Parliament) and a member of Parliamentary Energy Group raised the issue of environmental hazards resulting from mining activities in the Red Sea Hills. Similarly, (16) Foreign sector and government were blamed for appalling conditions of Beja workers in mines areas. In an interview with local leader and Beja Congress member from Musmar they mentioned that have repeatedly sent complaints to companies involved gold mining, they said that the companies activities contributed into disturbing Beja nomads. Besides, Some of local Beja representatives raised the issue with estate authorities of Red Sea Estates. They highlighted their concerns about mining activities in areas of; chemical waste, explosions, and increasing presence of vehicles in their villages. Some also complained about lose of land and absences of compensation. Local populations pointed out that the government have allocated land without consideration to any local consent to followers of the regime, government employees and including foreign companies(17) .



In response to these complaints, Ariab company declared that it would assist in social development of Ariab and Red Sea Hills areas. Emirates-based AL-Bayan on 15/10/1998 mentioned that Ariab Company allocated \$200.000 for the purpose of developing the Red Sea Hills and Sinkat area.

### **Exclusion and Expansion of Armed Resistance**

By late 1980s the region witnessed severe famine. Many Beja could not cope with rising price of food and severe drought. Ironically, the socio-economic situations of Red Sea region did not change much after Sudan gaining independence and up to the present date. Life of Beja people has deteriorated more due to negligence of public services. Other factors added their vulnerability are: collapse of agricultural projects (cotton), famines of 1980's/1990's, Structural Adjustment Policies, inability to cope with rising food prices. Limited political influence of Beja in central government, lack of social investment and loss of livestock coupled steadily led to collapse of coping strategies of pastoralist Beja and led to increase of rural and urban poverty and hunger. Moreover, the recent military regime of the National Salvation Revolution has shown strong tendency and commitment in applying the IMF packages of structural adjustment policies and launched a massive sale of public owned projects .

Economic pressures on the Beja has accelerated, exemplified by NIF's privatization of the Gash delta agricultural scheme. the government have allocated land without consideration to any local consent to followers of the regime, government employees and including foreign companies(18). This affirms that land has been a key factor in current reality of livelihood and conflict, not merely as an element in creation of injustice, but also as a



mechanism in Scio-economic dominance of the state and global elements. Those elements have historically used land to create conditions of inequality and imposing unfavorable terms on indigenous groups.

In additions, exclusion from resources and decision making were strong factors behind the creation of Beja Congress in 1958 with strong agenda of regional autonomy and commitment to fight against the marginalisation and underdevelopment could be regarded as a natural outcome of Beja discontent with their situation. From its early days, the congress advocated preserving Beja identity and land. To Beja Congress, land in particular has always been one of the main grievances. The movement which started as a regional demand group among educated Beja, linked the seizure of prime land to deterioration people's livelihoods and generation of local conflict around resources. Other grievances include, ill- representation for the Beja, socio-economic marginalisation, underdevelopment and lack of services.

### **Old claims and revival of resistance**

Today the agenda of the Congress focuses more on: equitable power and wealth sharing as well as political representation both at the regional and national levels, establishment of a genuine federal system with true decentralization of powers to the regions and just representation of all political forces at the local and national levels within a united Sudan.

By mid 1990 the Beja Congress acknowledged that economic and political grievances to breed armed insurgence in Eastern Sudan. It's important to understand that ignoring Beja and local groups when giving access to foreign investment will be grave mistake, blaming the NIF regime policy of in giving



licensed to gold mining companies behaved as a sole owner(19) in areas deeply rooted in different form of local tribal land system(20).

The congress enjoys a widespread political following in rural areas and amongst the poor Beja suburbs in Port Sudan, where it is extremely popular amongst the youth and the intellectuals. Both groups see the Congress as the only genuine representative of Beja interests, unlike traditional parties or traditional leaders, who have lost much of their clout amongst the younger. Besides, the Congress leaders have worked to expand their political platform to other groups living in eastern Sudan. This led to the formation of the Eastern Front in February 2005. The Front is a political alliance between the Beja Congress, the Rashaida Free Lions and representatives from other small ethno-political groups belonging to the Shukriya and the Dabaina.

The formation of the Front is an attempt by the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions to de-ethnicise their political agenda and appeal to other communities in eastern Sudan to unite in the fight against the marginalisation and the underdevelopment of the region. However, interviews carried by Sara Pantuliano (2005) with non Beja and non Rashaida groups, particularly in Kassala, revealed that the Front is still largely seen as closely affiliated to its two main ethnic groups and therefore not representative of other eastern Sudan communities, including immigrants from northern, western and southern Sudan.

The political agenda of the Free Lions is similar to that of the Beja Congress and is centred on the marginalisation and the underdevelopment of the region, the lack of fair representation and power sharing and the expansion of mechanised farming at the expense of nomadic migration routes which is affecting Rashaida livelihoods. Many of the Rashaida pointed to the



confiscation of a large number of four wheel drive vehicles by the government in the mid 1990s as an indicator of oppressive policies against the Rashaida and as a trigger for rebellion. As an attempt to win Rashaida GoS currently has returned part of those vehicles back to them.

The Free Lions seem to enjoy following amongst the youth, but community and tribal leaders question the need for the rebellion, especially, as they emphasise, since the government has recently been very supportive of Rashaida communities, allotting them land and providing services.

### **Destabilizing population and displacement**

- Growing number of poor and displaced people who lives in Port Sudan- 90% of the Red Sea population live in Port Sudan, a city with no water and sanitation infrastructure and limited sources of income.
- Unemployment due to increasing mechanized dock of Port Sudan and lack of job opportunities in mining companies.
- Limited economic and income options to cope with increasing prices of goods and services.
- Absence of governmental subsidies and complete withdrawal of public support in social sector. Beja were left with no options but to live in slums and margins of big cities like Port Sudan. Their income sources were diminishing due to rising prices of food, water, health services and transportation. Moreover, their situation as urban poor made them unable to pay school fees and therefore their children could not access formal education.



- Failure of coping mechanism and economic diversification activities due to diminishing of herd and animals.
- Increasing rate of internal displacement and migration to other countries.
- Cultural and social alienation: Due to factors associated to Beja attachment to their previous pastoralist lifestyle in urban setting. Pantuliano (2005) mentioned that:

*“For most Beja who have moved to town, livestock have retained their importance both in cultural (bride wealth payment), dietary (milk and meat) and economic terms (assets not eroded by inflation). It is interesting to note that the majority of them still describe themselves as pastoralists, even if they do not now own animals”* Pantuliano (2005)

As implied above, local population were left to face harsh condition with no mans of support. Moreover, urban Beja who lost lands were denied the basic human rights of living in dignity. Some of them believe that have not even been treated as a Sudanese indigenous group and citizens who have rights of residence and earning. Their loss of land and livelihood have not been compensated and their grievance has been dealt with in either denial or negligence. Besides, the government has not intervened in any projects to create positive living condition for both urban and rural population. This contributed in deepening the gap between those who are associated with power and foreign investment and the locals extreme deprivation. Further more, excusing and inequality such situation has created many tensions and has invited various levels of conflicts as :

- Inter-tribal conflicts; occur within the tribe between clans and lineage groups belonging to the same tribe.



- Conflicts between Beja tribes and tribes other than Beja principally the Rashaida and other ethnic groups from other parts of Sudan who has been viewed as an outsider. Tribal conflicts among the Beja tribes- mainly between Hadendowa as the most dominant Beja and Beni Amer who viewed by many as boundary tribes with Tergi language and Eritrean strong links.
- Poisonous of community relations: community put blames on those who works with government and foreign companies and accusing them of being supporters of un just regime.
- Many external observers have commented on the danger of a split amongst the Rashaida, with some potentially supporting the government against the Free Lions.
- Conflict around gold mining areas of Hoshiri and Araiab: Where local communities and community leaders are accusing foreign companies of sizing their land. Strong claims is supported by the environmental pollution caused by chemical waste resulted from gold mining activities around Araiab valley of the Red Sea Hills.
- Conflict are usually associated with land ownership, land use, land borders and conformity to the rules governing access to land and its use, mainly in the case of conflict between the Rashaida and the Beja has arisen principally over tribal land ownership and the political office of *nazara* associated with it. The Rashaida Free Lions feel that the Rashaida are Sudanese citizens and as such they have a right to land, regardless of historical claims by tribal groups over the whole region.
- Possibilities of extension of conflict to other regional elements due to ethnic, tribal and cultural links of population





## **Conclusion:**

For centuries the Red Sea Hills and Eastern Sudan as large has been excluded from national power and wealth. In global terms, the region remains one of the margins supplying international markets with cheap raw mineral material. Negligence extended from colonial through post-colonial to global era, despite the significant and strategic position of the Red Sea to Sudan and to world economy and to global security as large. Additionally, the position of Eastern Sudan is very significant to stability of many countries in the regions where many ethnic and tribal tensions had caused conflicts, a new conflict in this region might lead to further regional implications.

It is very crucial therefore, that both Sudan government and international community raise up to their obligations in addressing the issues of marginalization of Beja seriously. Since marginalization is reality more than claims as it has been shown in this study, a quick response is very much hoped for. Such response is hoped be peaceful and sustainable due to very fragile and sensitive situation.

As the grievances voiced by the Beja Congress 60 years ago still present and the cause of past injustices are the fuel of today's conflicts within the Red Sea region . The conflict most recurrent complaints that community, local and political leaders, and external observers alike quoted as a cause of conflict was the socio-economic marginalisation of the people in eastern Sudan, and the feeling of social exclusion which is so pervasive within their region and within Sudan as large.



Fergus Thomas, IRC programme coordinator for Northeast Sudan stated in his report about the situation of the Beja region on April 6,2005 that:

*"It is the most under-served, most remote area that I have ever worked in, with huge humanitarian needs—even in basic issues of nutrition and safe water, up to more complex health and education needs. The community have been left very much to themselves—for thousands of years really,(21)" .*

The reality remains that without rapid action, these native communities may be wiped out, taking with them vast indigenous knowledge, rich culture and traditions, and any hope of preserving their heritage. Their blight for survival is very much linked now to response from parties involved in the crisis as well as their strong believe in their just cause. .

Finally, this paper would suggest that in order to overcome the current unstable and tense situation, international community has to raise up to its legal and moral obligation in providing respectful and dignified peaceful living conditions to Beja. In this respect, sustainable strategic approach in responding to grassroots demands is strongly needed.

Creating positive livelihood in the Red Sea Hills of Sudan in a form of a partnership between international business, UN, multilateral agencies and Beja. This partnership would ensure mutual understanding of immediate and future needs stability and peace for all.



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(6) There is much debate in the literature (Palmisano, 1991; Morton, 1989) and amongst Beja intellectuals over whether the Beni Amer, can also be considered Beja, given that the large majority of them speak a different language, *Tigre* (a Semitic language related to Tigrinya and Amharic) and have a different social structure based on a caste system rather than a segmentary structure.

(7) Helenga (Supposedly of medieval Arab origin mixed with Beja, Tigre, and other Sudanese tribes, who speak a 'pidgin' form of *TuBedaw*. Please refer to **Pantuliano, S.** (2002) *Changes and Challenges facing the Beja Pastoralists of North Eastern Sudan*. *Pastoral Land Tenure Series no. 14*. London: (IIED).

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(9) Customary land tenure in rural Sudan has some characteristics such as: land is not formally registered, Rights lapse if land is not used for a certain period and women have restricted land rights.

(10) **Hommaida** (1998): *Poverty in Red Sea Hills*: MA Dissertation, School of Development Studies- University of East Anglia.

(11) Famine of 1990s in the region was analyzed within the context of natural resources management, expansion of mechanized farming and privatizing of Sudanese economy (Hommaida 1998).

(12) **Dirar, Suilman** (2005): *The Blight of Beja in Eastern Sudan*, Beja Congress Publications, cited in: <http://bejacongress.com/book.htm>



(13) **Sudan Embassy in New Deli**, India (2006) : <http://www.embassysudanindia.org/>

(14) **Dirar** (2005).

(15) Please refer to Sudan Gold Concession map (1).

(16) **Ismail Mohamed Deen** (1999), cited in Dirar (2205)

(17) Such as ‘Al -Wadi Al-Mogadas Company’ owned A Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden. The company introduced cultivation and exporting sunflower seeds. For further details please refer to: Hommaida (1995): Small Farmers in Eastern Sudan : Gash Farmers Unions: un published research paper, Dept. of Politics. University of Khartoum

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(19) Although, according to custom, outsiders - in the case of Red Sea- could have free access to land and water, they have to follow tradition in certain circumstances, as an acknowledgement that they do not claim the ownership of the land they use. There are also customary rules that organise access to water. According to custom (*uruf*) individuals (tribesmen and outsiders), access only to wells owned by the tribe or sub-tribe, and only by arrangement to wells owned by other tribes. See: Manger, L. O., Abd el Ati, H., Harir, S., Krzywinski, K. and Vetaas, O.R. (1996) *Survival on Meagre Resources. Hadendowa Pastoralism in the Red Sea Hills*. Uppsala: Nordiska Africainstitutet

(20) Please refer to: [www.sakanab.com](http://www.sakanab.com)

(21) **Abu Amna**, Mohamed (2005), The Beja of the Sudan struggle for survival, published on 6/11/2005 in [www.sudaneseonline.com](http://www.sudaneseonline.com)

\* A draft, subject to modifications.

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