NAIVASHA PEACE AGREEMENT’S LANGUAGE POLICY: DEMYTHOLOGISING OF THE ‘OLD’ AND CONSTRUCTING OF A ‘NEW’ LINGUISTIC IDENTITY IN THE SUDAN*

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Abstract
The month of May 2004 was a landmark in the history of the Sudan when the government and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM, i.e., the major southern opposition) signed key peace protocols on the 26th in the Kenyan town of Naivasha. One of the peace protocols contains a significant section on language policy. The language policy may substantiate the theoretical position that the ‘language question’ lies at the heart of the struggle to achieve a peaceful co-existence. This paper tries to achieve the following three objectives: firstly, to provide a critical and systematic analysis of the phraseology and content of the language policy. Secondly, to identify the regime of language rights sanctioned by the policy pronouncements vis-à-vis the current linguistic situation. Thirdly, to identify any possible repercussions the language policy, which has yet to materialise, may bring about on individual/collective identities (e.g., bilingual identification in Arabic-English, or English-vernacular). The output of the analysis may lead us to face the question of whether the whole country is witnessing the construction of a new linguistic identity manifested in the now politically-propagated expression ‘New Sudan’, which is increasingly gaining currency in the local and international media of public communication. If the answer is in the affirmative, then it is the contention of this endeavour that the language policy has succeeded in ‘de-essentialising’ the ideologically-driven stance on the status of some languages in the Sudan, namely, the Arabic language (i.e., it is not a fixed-given idiom, it is a human language on a par with other human languages), and in the construction of a ‘new’ identity, instead. The paper endorses a problematising practice as an epistemological methodology of analysis, which interrogates the components of our reality that are taken for granted, and interactively engages with questions of language power and ideology.

Introduction
The current reality of the disparate polities in Sudan challenges us to make the enterprise of language planning more politically accountable, and not to remain disengaged from the ideological question of ‘who we really are’, whether linguistically or nationally. Post-colonial language policies which are designed on the basis of ideologically-laden views of ‘who we should be’ rather than ‘who we really are’ have resulted in the production and reproduction of...
unequal power relations. A critical invocation of the constructed national diachronic narrative may provide a reply to the question of how we came to be the way we are. The claim that the blind imposition of a particular top-down nationalist project (i.e., people-making project) in a pluralist ecology was an act of betrayal to the cultural and linguistic diversity of the land, while provocative to nationalists, is in my view quite tenable. To claim that language is not part of the power struggle for the very survival of indigenous people plays into the conspiracy of silence that aims at wiping out the life stories and identities of indigenous polities. Despite of the availability of alternatives, nationalists and power holders chose plans which resulted in linguistic and cultural homogenisation, deploying coercive means of implementation. This was backed up with the machinery of state-education and centralised bureaucratic incorporation. Tragically, these policies ended up participating in the ‘fixing’ of particular ideological constructions of identity as ‘given’, ‘natural’ and ‘obvious’. The ideological reproduction of this making of people-hood which relied upon ‘a dialectic of collective remembering and forgetting’ (Billig 1996: 10) has been strengthened by the legitimating force of such policies on national and linguistic fronts. It is language that has the decisive job in the operation of this ideology and the construction of all forms of ideological consciousness (Voloshinov 1973: 13). Thus, the ‘demythologising’ of the common-place beliefs about our linguistic identity depends on a critical examination of concrete patterns of discourse (Billig 1996: 17).

Grounded partly on the above arguments, this paper attempts to analyse the new language policy that has been proposed as part of the peace agreement between the present ruling regime and the Southern opposition in Sudan. I present an analysis carried out with reference to the existing language policy and other official language pronouncements. The paper has the following organisational structure: I begin by outlining one of the widely-celebrated analytic frameworks of language planning, that is, Haugen’s 1983 model. Haugen’s framework provides,
a long with the above set of polemical views, the theoretical foundation upon which the analysis is carried out. In the second part of the paper I provide a systematic and comparative analysis of the policy. In the final section I sum up the paper and draw some conclusions.

1. A theoretical model of language planning

Haugen (1983) suggested a framework of language planning that comprised four steps: (1) selection of norm; (2) codification of form; (3) elaboration of function; (4) implementation***. The four aspects form a matrix that can be viewed either from a societal or a linguistic perspective (see Table 1). The societal perspective, which is termed ‘status planning’, encompasses the selection and implementation of a national/official language. The linguistic perspective, on the other hand, is called ‘corpus planning’ and includes the codification and elaboration of the form of a language. Haugen points out that the planning process always starts with a status planning decision; hence I start by describing this stage of status planning as the first step in the process.

1.1 Status planning

Status planning refers to those activities that intend to modify the environment in which the language is used (see Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 28). The status planning stage consists of two steps: language selection and language implementation.

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<th>Form (Policy planning)</th>
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<td>Society (Status planning)</td>
<td>1. Selection (decision procedures)</td>
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<td>a. Problem identification</td>
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The selection stage is concerned with the choice of a language by/for a society through its political leaders (ibid.). Two decision procedures are recognised by Haugen: identification of the problem and allocation of the norm. For the identification of the problem, it should be noted that the selection of a national or an official language is not as easy as it seems to be because it entails a choice among rival languages. In addition, the internal linguistic variation within a language can pose another problem: for instance which variety (i.e., dialect) of a language that is nominated to play the role of a national language should be selected? The decision procedure that deals with this question is called ‘allocation of norms’, which is the second selectional (decision) procedure in Haugen’s (1983) framework. The allocation of norms procedure refers to the decisions at the status level that determine which variety of a local language will be officialised and standardised. At this stage, the importance of creating a national language academy to define the ‘standard’ variety comes into play (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 36). These procedures make up the selection stage of status planning at the societal level.

Haugen defines the next stage of his model, that is implementation, as ‘work of cajoling or enforcing compliance with decisions made in code selection and codification, which we usually leave to governments, or school systems, or any other agency that carries weight with the general public, such as the media, whether written or oral’ (Haugen 1983: 269). One aspect of
this involves correction procedures, which are defined as ‘specific measures taken to implement the social aspects of a language plan’ (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 36). It is generally agreed that the formal education system is one of the effective channels participating in the implementation of a language policy. In addition to the education system, governments, private individuals and media campaigns play a major role in the dissemination of a new language. More importantly, the implementation strategies to change a particular language situation should be reinforced or changed on the basis of the constant feedback that is provided by an ongoing evaluation (ibid.: 37).

Having discussed the status planning, I will now move on to examine the second part of Haugen’s (1983) model of language planning, corpus planning.

1.2 Corpus planning

Corpus planning refers to intentions to modify the language itself (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 28). Haugen, as can be seen in Table 1, divides corpus planning activities into two groups: those related to the establishment of norms (or policy planning), which are labelled ‘codification’ (or standardisation procedures), and those related to the extension of the functions of language (or language cultivation), which are referred to as ‘elaboration’ (or functional development of language). The aim of corpus planning is to minimise variation in form and to maximise variation in function (Haugen 1966: 249). Corpus planning therefore has two missions: to differentiate a particular language from its neighbours and to reinforce internal cohesion and unity.

Let us examine in turn the two components of corpus planning: codification and elaboration. Codification refers to the ‘standardisation procedures needed to develop and formalise a linguistic and usually literate set of language norms’ (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 39).
Haugen points out that codification comprises three processes: graphisation, grammatication and lexication. The output of these processes is respectively: a system of orthography, a grammar, and a dictionary. Graphisation is the first step in the standardisation process. It refers to the activity of developing a writing system using an alphabet, a syllabary or a system of ideograms to provide a foundation on which literacy can be based, with the potential consequence of reducing the linguistic variation in the language of a given polity. Grammatication refers to the extraction and formulation of rules that describe the structural organisation of a language. Lexication: ‘Involves the assignment of styles and spheres of usage for the words of the language’ (Haugen 1983: 271).

It is worth noting that codification is not the end of the story. Following codification of a language, the process should still continue ‘the implementation of the norm to meet the functions of a modern world’ (ibid.: 373). This continued implementation of a norm is referred to as elaboration. Haugen notes that a codified language should be elaborated to meet the wide range of cultural demands put upon it with respect to terminology and style. For stylistic development, it is generally agreed that ‘each language has its own discourses appropriate for each of the domains in which it is used. Stylistic development signals a recognition that, without appropriate development of linguistic style in those domains important to a language, it is not fully able to meet all the demands placed upon it’ (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 45).

By way of concluding this section of the paper, it should be stressed that although Haugen’s revised model of language planning covers many aspects of the process, it is still far from being a comprehensive framework. Haugen himself acknowledges this fact. He writes: ‘Even with this revised model I cannot claim that it amounts to a theory of language planning. It provides a description of what language planners have done, but it does not tell us why they have done it, nor what goals they have hoped to attain’ (Haugen 1983: 274).
2. The analysis of the language policy of the Naivasha Peace Agreement

2.1 The socio-historical context of the policy

The Republic of Sudan covers 967,000 square miles, making it the largest country in Africa. The number of languages listed on the Ethnologue website for Sudan is 142, of which 134 are living languages and eight are extinct (see Ethnologue, languages of Sudan). The country is divided sharply into two distinct areas, both in geographical area, and in ethnic group, and cultural systems. The Northern part of Sudan is occupied by a hybrid Arab race that is united by one language, one culture and one religion, and they look to the Arab world for their cultural and political inspiration. The people of Southern Sudan, on the other hand, belong to the East African group. They differ from the hybrid Arab race in origin, arrangement and basic systems (see Yokwe 1984: 151). The two regions have been at war for around forty years (i.e., 1955-1972, 1983-2004). The Sudanese civil war started in 1955 when the Southern opposition took up arms fighting for self-government in the Southern part of the country. Some two million people died, mostly through war-induced famine and disease. But, 26th May 2004 has been considered a landmark in the history of Sudan, when the National Congress Party (the ruling political party, NCP henceforth), and the Southern opposition, represented by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed key peace protocols in the Kenyan town of Naivasha.

One of the peace protocols contains a significant section on language policy. Historically, politicians have turned a deaf ear to the issue of linguistic diversity in Sudan. However, the language policy in the current peace protocols may indicate that the two rivals who signed them, or at least one of them, has recovered from a kind of imperial amnesia – the refusal or inability to confront the complexity of history from which emerged various discourses on language and education in the country (Tupas 2003) – and have recognised that the question of language is at the heart of the struggle.
2.2 Data and methodology of analysis

2.2.1 Methodology

The data on which this paper is based constitutes the new proposed language policy that has come as part of the protocol on power sharing. Although a thorough critical review of the language policy of the peace accord requires a passing reference to the existing language policy and other official language pronouncements. However, since I do not have space to examine the historical development of language policies in detail, my approach will be eclectic. My critical analysis of the policy will use the methodological treatment of problematising practice, which is grounded on the unwillingness to ‘accept the taken-for-granted components of our reality and the “official” accounts of how they came to be the way they are’ (Dean 1994: 4). I employ the term ‘critical’ here in the sense that the analysis engages with questions of power and inequality in language planning and the implications of taking up one interpretive position over another (Pennycook 2001). Since the policy has yet to be implemented, and the corpus planning stage is very much bound up with achieving peace and stability across the whole country, my examination of the language policy statements will be restricted to the status planning level (decision-making level). Finally, I should note that the analysis has pretensions to treat exhaustively neither the language policy nor possible future language change in Sudan.

2.2.2 Data analysis

The language policy comprises five statements (see the Protocol on Power-sharing) which will be analysed in turn. It should be noted that the statements will be underlined to distinguish them from previous or existing language policy statements.

The first statement stipulates:

2.8.1 All the indigenous languages are national languages which shall be respected developed and promoted.
An initial observation of this statement is the use of the expression ‘all the indigenous languages’, which requires a brief comment. Since no state (i.e., in the technical sense of modern state) could extend national status to ‘all’ indigenous languages spoken within its territory, this means that the statement offers, to use a terminology proposed by Rubio-Marin (2003), a ‘non-instrumental language right’. In other words, the statement attaches a symbolic (political) status to ‘all’ languages of the Sudan. But the current National Constitution of 1998 (see UNESCO’S MOST Clearing House) grants local languages this symbolic recognition. Clause 27 of the Constitution stipulates: ‘There shall be guaranteed for every community or group of citizens the right to preserve their particular culture, language or religion and rear children freely within the framework of their particularity, and the same shall not by coercion be effaced’.

On the face of it, the National Constitution of 1998 and the new policy in Sudan offer indigenous people the right to preserve their languages, cultures and religions, and thus a sense of respect to Sudanese local languages seems to be guaranteed on the basis of linguistic human rights. The immediate question then is: what is the difference between the two language policy statements, if any? A careful examination reveals a big gulf between the two policy statements, emphasised, and not created, by the use of the term ‘national’ in the new language policy. The Constitutional policy statement does not consider local languages as ‘national’ languages. By contrast, the new policy statement makes a call for not only respecting ‘all’ Sudanese local languages but also considering them as ‘national’ languages. Thus, the term ‘national’ entails more than granting a ‘symbolic status’ to local languages: it implies the existence of a reality that has been denied by power holders in the centre since the first days of independence, as exemplified by the following quote:

As the Sudan is one country sharing one set of political institutions, it is of great importance that there should be one language which is understood by all its citizens. That
language could only be Arabic, and Arabic must therefore be taught in all our schools. (The first Sudanese Minister of Education speaking in the national Assembly for his government in 1953, cited in Yokwe 1984: 157)

The above speech provides a useful intellectual genealogy for the current national policy of Arabicisation and the type of nationalism politicians aspired to achieve at that time. A cursory lexical examination of the above quote shows that politicians of the time were preoccupied with the task of building a homogeneous nation on the basis of ‘one country, one language, one set of political institutions’. More specifically, the authoritative proclamation ‘that language could only be Arabic’ was a clear indication that linguistic homogenisation has been one of the principal mechanisms of building a collective civic identity within such a diverse country as Sudan. The historical process which shows the realising of this monolingual policy could be made clear with reference to Haugen’s framework of language planning. Generally speaking, the above quotation can be said to exemplify the first stage of language planning (i.e. selection). The language problem was that a set of political institutions should have a language in which it can communicate with people, and this represents the step of ‘problem identification’ in Haugen’s model. After identifying the problem, power holders decided for the people that ‘that language could only be Arabic’, ignoring the cultural and linguistic identities of other ethnic groups, using probably the numerical majority as a selectional criterion of choosing it. In addition, they selected the Khartoum variety of Sudanese Arabic as the standard variety (i.e., allocation of norms). After the selection of the Arabic language, two implementational bodies were used to materialise the policy, the state bureaucracy and education (implementation stage in Haugen’s framework). A final note on this quote is that the misguided generalisation that Arabic language is ‘understood by all its citizens’ involves depriving the regionally and historically rooted
language groups of the right to maintain political institutions operating in a language of their choice. Viewed in this context, it could be safely argued that this policy of linguistic homogenisation which culminated in the official declaration of the Arabicisation policy was one of the basic ingredients of the recipe that led to the civil war.

To bring the threads of the discussion together, it is clear that the post-independence language policy recognised official monolingualism as the norm in Sudan, and stated that the official language ‘could only be Arabic’. By contrast, by stating that ‘all indigenous languages are national languages’, the new policy statement conveys a sense of political recognition of the fact that linguistic and cultural diversity is the rule in Sudan. Put in other way, the linguistic expression ‘national languages’ may hold two socio-politically incompatible implications in relation to the ideologies of the two political parties (SPLM and NCP). For the SPLM, which believes in social transformation and cultural pluralism, the implication is that the current supreme status enjoyed by Arabic-speaking nationals is rejected outright since the other local languages equally grant their speaking ethnic groups the status of Sudanese nationals. In fact the SPLM, the Sudanese communists and socialists consider, or aspire to see, Sudan as ‘a democracy of nationalities, cooperating voluntarily and autonomously but within a united Sudan in the enterprise of self-realisation through the perfection of men according to their own kind’ (AbdelSalam 1989: 34). This binary act of pluralizing and indigenising of national identity on the basis of linguistic diversity can be interpreted as a strategic recast of the political concept ‘nations without states’, which refers to cultural communities that have no separate political institutional representations. The potential of witnessing the South of Sudan as an independent sovereign state within the international system of nation-states lends support to this interpretation (a referendum will be held to decide the fate of the South in six years). The political implication behind the assertion of this reality is that cultural communities have the potential to change the
current configuration of the structural system by interrogating the legitimacy and the democratic credentials of power-holders who are hostile to internal national diversity (Guibernau 2001). Given this interpretation, this language policy statement has, then, de-naturalised, employing Billig’s (1996) phrase, the ‘invented permanency’ of the status of Arabic as the essential marker of national identification in the Sudan. For the NCP, on the other hand, such an assertion of the multiplicity of national identity is an entirely forbidden discourse. For the NCP, Arabic is not just a vehicle of communication, but also a marker of their religious identity and a symbol of their ideological power. Therefore, for the ruling elites, the first policy statement may not proceed beyond a symbolic recognition which, in the view of the SPLM, may just result in producing the existing linguistic hierarchisation of indigenous languages and people. The consequence of the fact that power holders draw an essential relationship between Arabic and Islam conveys the emotionally-charged view that if the status of Arabic was to be challenged, the status of Islam would be challenged correspondingly. Thus, a sense of linguistic security for the status of Arabic language is required, and this was exactly the task of the second policy statement:

Arabic language is the widely spoken national language in the Sudan.

The third statement goes on to stipulate:

Arabic, as a major language at the national level, and English shall be the official working languages of the National Government business and languages of instruction for higher education.

In status planning terms, the politicians who signed the peace agreement have decided that English and Arabic will be the official languages in which all official documents and educational provision at higher level must be made available, and this represents the stage of ‘selection’ in Haugen’s framework of language planning. More specifically, the policy statement...
refers to two instruments of implementation (or correction procedures in Haugen’s framework): national governmental business (i.e., government institutions) and higher education (i.e., the educational sector). Let us comment on each of them briefly. I have alluded above to the primacy of the machinery of state bureaucracy and state education in the implementation of language policies. Although the space available here is limited, a point on the language-in-educational policy seems in order concerning the concept of literacy. The concept of literacy in the form it is realised and taught at schools, be it primary or secondary, has participated in the inequitable distribution of the linguistic resources of the country. The endorsement of a multi-literacy approach could have solved the riddle of ‘how to make the Southern boys literate without alienating them from their rural environment’ (Sanderson and Sanderson 1981: 335); however, the power holders opted to implement a nation-building policy of education with a focus on ‘assimilation and standardisation for the Southern educational system, and especially in linguistic standardisation by the use of Arabic as the sole medium of instruction’ (ibid.: 336). Thus, monolingual language-in-education policies in essentially multilingual ecologies take part of the blame for spearheading violence within a nation since they deal with language as a ‘conduit metaphor’ (Reddy 1979) bearing no ideological power. In this linguistically alienating environment, wars launched by ‘peripheralised’ speech communities may be rightly read into battles by minority groups to make their meaning stick as official languages (Thompson 1984: 132).

The fourth statement stipulates:

In addition to Arabic and English, the legislature of any sub-national level of Government may adopt any other national language(s) as additional official working language(s) at its level.
A first remark on this statement is that the term ‘Government’ with a capital G refers to the federal/national government, and ‘sub-national level of Government’ refers to the states or regions. In this context, the proposed language policy could be described as a form of decentralised language planning, in contrast to the existing language policy, which has adopted a form of centralised language planning. The expression ‘sub-national level’ hints at the type of political structure suggested by the peace agreement and which provides the right environment for the application of the language policy. It goes without saying that the appropriate structural system in such multilingual contexts is decentralisation or federalism (see Wright 2004: 70). It is fair to note that the peace agreement, at least at the level of theory, is aware of this principle on which the language policy is based and could be implemented, and which could lead to the empowerment of minority groups. The parties who signed the protocols put it bluntly that they are ‘convinced that decentralisation and empowerment of all levels of government are cardinal principles of effective and fair administration of the country’. Yet, it should be noted that the ruling party claims that it has applied a federal system and has divided the country into regional states since the beginning of the 1990s. If this is the case, then the question that imposes itself here is: what differentiates the two federalisms and how do they affect the linguistic map of the country? To begin with, since the NCP has imposed the top-down policy of Arabicisation and, paradoxically, claims that it has applied a federative system in the country, we have a conundrum. That is to say, the policy of Arabicisation by definition seeks cultural assimilation and has the planned goal of making, in the language of the first Education Minster, ‘all the citizens’ into Arabic speakers; and hence it is deeply hostile to any form of accommodation which obstructs this goal, including federalism. In addition, it associates a sense of national belonging with a particular ethno-linguistic group and thus predictably results in parochialism, chauvinism and, above all, what can be called a ‘banal linguistic cleansing’ under the politically
concerted rhetoric of ‘unity in diversity’. This riddle can be solved if we take into consideration the fact that the nation-building project has generally required a particular type of political and structural system, namely centralisation or unitarism. The only type of federalism, if any at all, that seems compatible with the policy of Arabisation is a ‘mono-national federalism’, and, consequently, this turns the whole nationalist project of the NCP to be ‘federal in form and centralised unitary in content’. This type of political organisation is completely incompatible with the SPLM’s ideology which involves a totally different philosophy of federalism. The type of federalism that is advocated by the SPLM and, in fact, the different ethnolinguistic groups is a ‘multiethnic’ or ‘multinational’ federalism that unites ‘people who seek the advantages of membership of a common political unit, but differ markedly in descent, language and culture’ (Forsyth 1989: 4). So, the compatible context for the implementation of the new language policy is a type of structural system that rightly adopts multiethnic federalism as a principle of political governing. The implication to be drawn here is that the ‘old’ mono-linguistic/national statement of identification that was grounded in a centralised structural system was an ideological creation ‘mythologised’ to implement a particularistic nationalist project. In its stead, a ‘new’ narrative of identity is proposed to be ‘constructed’ within a multiethnic federalist system whose defining features are an officialised complementarity between Arabic and English (i.e., bilingualism) at the national level, in addition to a local language, pending on the decision of the sub-national legislature, at the regional state level (i.e., trilingualism).

Being located in such a new political context, the new language policy could be said, using the relevant technical terminology, to apply the ‘territoriality and personality principle’ of language planning (see Patten and Kymlicka 2003). At its simplest, according to the territoriality principle the choice of official languages varies from region to region in terms of local conditions. For example, the Western region could choose X as an official language according to
its local conditions, making the selected official language in that region not the same as the official language in the Eastern or Southern regions of Sudan. The ‘personality principle’ signifies that English and Arabic are the official languages at national level. That is to say, citizens can use English or Arabic wherever they choose to stay in Sudan and should not be discriminated against. To summarise, this statement grants the constitutional right to local polities to speak their local languages. In so doing, as Joseph (1999) rightly describes it, they are telling a narrative about themselves, about who they are. Moreover, the ‘personality principle’ is confirmed by the last statement in the proposed language policy which forbids any discrimination on the basis of language:

The use of either language at any level of government or education shall not be discriminated against.

3. Conclusion

This paper has sought to provide a critical and comparative analysis of the new language policy of the Naivasha Peace Agreement in Sudan. The new language policy at this stage represents the socio-political aspect of status planning in Haugen’s 1983 model. The policy states that people should not be discriminated against on the basis of language since all local languages are equal. My analysis has shown that the implementation of the policy will lead to bilingual identification in Arabic and English at the national level. Trilingualism is likely to emerge at regional levels if a sub-national legislature officialises a local language in addition to English and Arabic.

I end up this endeavour with three points. Firstly, I am not claiming that the new language policy, if it was to be implemented faithfully, would blur power inequalities and would reconstruct a Sudanese society that is free of power conflicts. I am very well aware of the
argument that ‘in any society, language planning and language teaching necessarily entail rehashing of existing power relations simply because power is exercised in and through language’ (Rajagopalan 1999: 205-206). However, I am also aware of the counterargument that such a stance ‘urges us to bury our eyes ostrich-like to the political evils and ideological temptations outside. Divorcing our moral sensibility and social consciousness from our profession’ (Canagarajah 1999: 211). Secondly, the implementation of the language policy is not an event that is going to change the whole situation in the Sudan overnight, rather it is a process through which ‘a lot of things can in fact be done to negotiate, modify, and even change power – at least in certain limited domains – creating in the process relatively more democratic relations’ (Canagarajah ibid.). I am claiming, however, that a faithful implementation of this decentralised language policy within the suggested multi-ethnic federalist system will not only contain (i.e., prevent) the southern potential secessionism but also the divisive monolingualism, and I am quite aware of the fact that such a contention requires to be defended by strong empirical support, an issue which I am prepared to pursue in another space.

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*** Haugen (1969) proposed a model that comprised four steps: (1) selection (2) codification (3) elaboration (4) propagation. Haugen revised this model in his paper of 1983, and substituted ‘implementation’ for ‘propagation’.